SWEDISH DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

CATS
Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies

Åbo Akademi
University

Asymmetric Challenges
- an academic and a bureacratic view

NOVA, SIRP and IDN 5th International Seminar

Lisbon 12 December 2017

Dr. Lars Nicander

The Thesis

Dissertation structure on the linkage threat-planning

New Threats – Old Routines



Intro
(Purpose, context, state of research, structure)

Article 1 (Comp.)

Theory/empiri
Dealing with cross-sectorial threats (CIIP) in various countries.
(Policy Studies, Routledge)

Article 2+3 (Threat))

Theory/empiri
Adaptility and pluralism within IC.
(IJIC, Routledge)

Terrorism and CIIP (DIJ)

Article 4&5.1+5.2 (Planning)

Crossectorial planning
- the Swedish example
(Routledge)

Theory/empiri
Pluralism (”second opinion”, think-tanks etc) in support of public policy (IJIC, Routledge)

Analysis/conclusion, theory validation, differences USA-Europe/Sweden
New knowledge?

Background

- The modern information society is more and more exposed to unpredictable and changing threats.
- How can a central government machinery become agile and adapt to these threats with implementing effective protective policies and mesaures?
- How come that modern societies differ in this respect?
- How transparent and effective are these processes in the core of central government?
  - Is there a ”missing link” in the policy process between input and output?
- What (pluralistic) role can Think Tanks achive?

Research question

- Which variables affect the planning process – and how - from detection of new threat conditions to implementing necessary protective mesaures?
  - How have security policy related threats evolved and been precepted after ”the cold war”?
  - Do these new threats stimulate *innovation* and *change* within the government as well developing new policies and implementing of these?
  - What and where are the main “bottlenecks” to convert these new threat adaptivity to protective measures?

Method, definitions, delimitations etc

- Inductive method, cross sector approach
- No exisisting theories but ”policy transfer analysis” starts a framing
- Definitions: Intelligence, knowledge monopoly
- Delimitations: not time-critical processes and crisis managment– more focus on resilient system functionality
- New earlier and not studied processes (”critical ontological turn”)

Six articles

- Shielding the net – understanding the issue of vulnerability and threat to the information society
  - Published 2010 in Policy Studies Vol.31, No.3, May 2010, p.283-300, by Routledge
- Understanding Intelligence Community Innovation in the Post-9/11 World
  - Published 2011 in International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Vol.24, No.3, May 2011, p.534-568 by Routledge
- Information Terrorism – When and by Whom?
  - Published 2007 in Defense Intelligence Journal Vol.16, No.2, p.139-154 by National Defense Intelligence College Foundation, Inc.
- The Trojan Horse in the Information Age
  - Published 2006 in Countering Terrorism and WMD by Routledge
- The role of Think-Tanks in the US Security Policy Environment – A Forgotten Actor?
  - Published 2015 in International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Vol.28, No.3, May 2015, p.480-501 by Routledge
- The Recipe For Think Tank Success: From the Insiders' Perspective
  - Accepted by International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence for fall 2015 (Routledge)

Article 1(comparative study)

Analysis model



Country 1, 2, 3, 4
Year 0 --Year N
Threat detection Implemented action

Country 5, 6
Year 0-- Year N-X
Threat detection Implemented action

Assignment: Illustrate/explain X

Article 2

Intel adaptibility (”Input”)



Article 3

New terrorism threats (”Input”)



Article 4

Protective measures (”Output”)



Article 5.1+5.2

Pluralism/Think Tanks



Ideal case

Analysis model (Ideal case)



B

Cabinet Offices, NSC etc

The Policy Process ("the missing link")

"Politics"

Policy decisions

A

Intelligence community

Threat observation

B1

Intel

B2

Policy/budget

B3

Planning

C

Bureaucracy/agencies

Planning/ implementation

Tainted case



Analysis model (Tainted case)

B

Cabinet Offices, NSC etc

The Policy Process ("the missing link")

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Bureaucracy/agencies

Planning/ implementation

Think Tanks

Result

- So far very understudied processes
- Slimmed policy levels (Cabinet Offices) results in less competent customers and give the bureacracy more leverage (NPM)
- Pluralism (TT) seems to give more transparancy and result in better and faster decision/outcomes in cincerned security policy related areas
- Even good systems have problems to handle non-rational directives from the policy level (”politisising”)

Today´s threat environment in the Nordic/Baltic area - some applicable thoughts

Asymmetric Warfare



Phase 0,2-1,0

Foreign Policy, StratCom, ”Active measures”

- Energy-, finance-, trade- and migration weapons
- Support pro-russians parties to split EU/Nato
- International/ Security Policy level

Phase 0,5-1,0

IO

- Cyberops
- Influence ops (”nettrolls”)
- Strat/National level

Phase 0,8-1,0

Hybrid ops

- ”Small green men”
- Mil-LEA coop
- Op-Tact level

Possible Solutions

Immediate issues

- ”Small green men”
  - → Deputizing Nato/bilat SOF-units to concerned countries
- ”Net trolls”
  - Joint venture Intel-PD to identify, understand and counter
  - Cold War lessons revisited
- How to prevent ”Trojan Horse”-countries within Nato/EU?
  - ?

Long-Term Planning

- Need for smooth Cabinet processes
- Whole-of-Government Approach
  - Joint exercises on the highest levels (cabinet-agencies)
  - Joint Situation Awareness + ”Team-play”
    - Cyber attacks + Psyops?
  - LEA-mil cooperation to avoid exploting government seams
- NPM doesn´t go well with National Defense and societal security/resilience

Hybrid CoE



Steering Board

Director

Administration & Support

International Relations & Communication

Training & Exercises

COI Coordination and Support

Research & Strategic Analysis

COI on Hybrid Influencing (leader: UK)

COI on Terrorism & Radicalism (leader: -)

COI on Vulnerabilities & Resilience (leader: FIN)

Q&A

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